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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 920239-CA

RICHARD M. MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant .

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by
virtue of the provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(f) , Utah Code Annotated
(1953) as amended.
ISSUES
1.

Whether the Appellant was entrapped to commit the

offense for which he was convicted.

The standard of review is that

if reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence of entrapment
should necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the Appellant's
guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

State v. Kourbelas, 621

P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980).
2.

Whether Rule 608(b) of the Rules of Evidence pro-

hibits the testimony of a witness that an undercover police officer
used illegal drugs during the time the officer was investigating
the Appellant, where the officer had testified on cross-examination
that she did not use illegal drugs during that time.

The standard

of review is whether the trial court's ruling excluding this evi-

dence constituted error affecting a substantial right of the
Appellant,

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a); State v. Tuc-

ker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990) n.l at 821.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Const, art. I, § 7: No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Utah Const, art. I, § 12: In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel , to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the.county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. . . .
STATUTES
§76-2-303(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953): It
is a defense that the actor was entrapped into
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs
when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the
officer induces the commission of an offense
in order to obtain evidence of the commission
for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit
it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.

RULES
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 608(b): Specific
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of a crime as
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction based
on a jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of distribution of a
controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of
§58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below
Appellant was charged with two counts of distributing
cocaine.

At a pretrial hearing on Appellant's assertion of the

defense of entrapment, the trial judge ruled that, as a matter of
law, Appellant was not entrapped into commission of the offenses
(R. 60).

The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict

of not guilty as to one count and guilty as to the other.

Appel-

lant was sentenced to the statutory prison term, but was placed on
probation on conditions including fines, restitution and serving
75 days in jail.

This appeal followed.

The pretrial hearing on entrapment was heard on the same day
as that in another case involving the same witnesses and counsel. The transcript of the entrapment hearing in this case does
not include the trial judge's findings on the record. However,
the transcript of the entrapment hearing in the other case (State
v. LeVasseur) does contain the trial court's oral findings in this
case. The pertinent pages of that transcript are included in the
appendix to this brief.

Statement of Facts
I.

The Police Conduct

Officer Anne Burchett met Appellant at a Cedar City
bar in November of 19 9 0 (T. 63).

Burchett was working as an

undercover narcotics agent, attempting to establish social relationships in order to obtain drugs (T. 130). At this first meeting, the two made plans that she would later come to his home for
dinner (ET. 12). When they got together at Appellantfs house, he
cooked dinner for her (ET. 13) and they sat in front of the fireplace (T. 94), where Appellant asked Burchett if she used cocaine.
She said that she did (T. 65). During the conversation in front
of the fire, Burchett mentioned that at her house she had some
firewood that needed chopping (T. 9 5).

A short while later, Ap-

pellant came to her house and chopped the wood (ET. 14).

She

made coffee and invited him in (ET. 15), and when he left, Appellant kissed her (T. 103; ET. 26). Some time before Christmas,
they spent two or three hours together driving around the Cedar
City area in Appellant's truck looking at Christmas lights (T. 67,
97; ET. 16).
On May 8, 1991, Appellant invited Burchett to his home
after she finished work (PT. 6 ) , and after some conversation in the
kitchen, Burchett told him that as a bartender she knew a lot of
people at her place of work who were looking for cocaine (T. 67;
PT. 30). Appellant told Burchett that he would get the cocaine for

The record includes three transcripts, designated in this brief
as follows: Trial ("T."), Pretrial Entrapment Hearing ("ET."),
and Preliminary Hearing ("PT.").

her in Las Vegas, where the two went in Burchett1s car on May 10,
1991 (T. 69). Burchett had told Appellant she didn't have the
money to buy the drugs, so Appellant loaned her the necessary
$350.00, which Burchett later paid back (ET. 33; T. 109). Appellant got the cocaine and gave it to Burchett when they returned to her house in Hamilton Fort (PT. 12).
After the first drug transaction, Appellant and Burchett
continued their relationship, exchanging phone calls (ET. 19) and
meeting at a bar (PT. 22). At one point, Burchett left a message
on Appellant's answering machine asking him why he hadn't stopped
by to pick her up on his way to go water skiing, since she wanted
to go with him to the lake (T. 104). Some time before July 29,
1991, the two went on a date to Mesquite, Nevada to have dinner and
to gamble, Appellant paying for the dinner and drinks (T. 105,
163; ET. 24). Burchett concedes that this date may have been at
her suggestion (ET. 25) .
On July 26, 1991 Appellant asked Burchett if she wanted
to get more cocaine to sell (T. 78), and, after arranging with her
supervisors to get the money, Burchett called Appellant back and
told him yes.

The two originally planned that Burchett would

again accompany Appellant to Las Vegas to get the drugs(ET. 21),
but, being unable to arrange details with her supervisors, Burchett told Appellant at the last instant that her parents had been
in an automobile accident in Salt Lake City, and that she had to
go there instead (T. 81). Burchett took Appellant the agreed sum
of $750.00, leaving it with him at his house, and telling him she
was on her way to Salt Lake City (T. 82). On July 29, 1991, Ap-

pellant phoned Burchett, telling her he'd gotten the cocaine in
Las Vegas, and arranging for her to pick it up at his house on
that day (T. 8 4).
Agent Burchett was operating in a system where there
were no written rules or policies governing the conduct of undercover agents (T. 151) , and where it was considered important and
necessary for her to develop close personal relationships with
people in order to buy drugs (T. 161) . Although she made written
reports detailing actual drug transactions, she did not consider
it important to make written reports about all the other contacts
she had with Appellant when drugs were not discussed or transacted
(T. 100, 101)

f

including kissing, holding hands (PT. 34), discus-

sing religion (T. 98) and personal phone calls between the two
in which drugs were not mentioned (ET. 20). Agent Burchett1s
conduct as an undercover officer was governed only by the personal
opinions of her supervisor Garth Wilkinson as to the propriety of
her behavior (T. 151-154) and by her own "common sense" (T. 90);
she was so unfettered that on one occasion she engaged in sexual
intercourse with a "target defendant," (T. 119) who was subsequently
not prosecuted (T. 126) .
II.

The Disputed Trial Testimony

During cross-examination agent Burchett denied using
illegal drugs in the course of her investigation of Appellant
(T. 112). The defense produced a witness, Jeff Farr, who was
prepared to testify that he knew agent Anne Burchett intimately

during the time she was working on Appellant's case, and that
Burchett used cocaine and marijuana with the witness on several
occasions (T. 133). Farr was also prepared to testify that he was
familiar with the effects of illegal drugs, and that on many occasions he observed Burchett to be under the influence of the drugs
they used together, inconsistent with Burchett's only having simulated the use of the drugs (T. 134). The prosecutor objected to
the admission of this testimony on the ground that it was prohibited by Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (T. 134), and
the trial judge sustained the objection, ruling the proferred testimony inadmissible (T. 141).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The conduct of the police in procuring drugs from

the Appellant was entrapment within the meaning of §76-2-303(1),
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as enacted by Laws, 1973.

The evidence

establishes as a matter of law that Anne Burchett induced the commission of the offenses by methods creating a substantial risk
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it.

Reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence should

necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the Appellant's guilt.
2.

The trial judge incorrectly excluded the testimony

of defense witness Jeff Farr under Rule 608 (b).
admissible as impeachment of agent Anne Burchett.

The testimony was
The exclusion of

the testimony was a denial of Appellant's right to due process and
to present witnesses in his defense, in violation of Utah Const,
art. I, §7 and §12.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE POLICE CONDUCT IN PROCURING DRUGS FROM APPELLANT
WAS ENTRAPMENT.
The defense of entrapment set forth in Utah Code Ann.

§76-2-303(1) (1977) embodies an objective standard, focusing
the inquiry to the nature of the police conduct:
"Under the objective view of entrapment,
the focus is not on the propensities
and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police conduct falls below standards to which
common feelings respond, for the proper use of government power. This concept establishes entrapment on its historical basis, the refusal to countenance a perversion of justice by government misconduct. The objective
view provides a solid definitive
standard upon which the defense can
rest, i.e., does the conduct of the
government comport with a fair and
honorable administration of justice?"
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah
1979) at 500.
In each entrapment case the propriety of the inducement by the police is measured by its probable effect on a hypothetical person in the setting in which the inducement took
place.

State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987).

Every

case in which the defense is raised must be carefully examined
on its own facts,

State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988),

and the Utah Supreme Court has suggested that the very circumstances in this case may go beyond the proper exercise of the government 1 s power:

"Extreme pleas of desperate illness or
appeals based primarily on sympathy,
pity, or close personal friendship, or
offers of inordinate sums of money,
are examples, depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each
case, of what might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating
the course of conduct between the
government representative and the defendant, the transactions leading up
to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant,
and the response to the inducements
of the agent, are all to be considered in judging what the effect of
the government agent's conduct would
be on a normal person." Taylor, 599
P.2d at 503 (emphasis added).
Agent Burchett's procurement of drugs from Appellant
resulted from an appeal based primarily on the close personal
friendship the two shared.

When she initiated the first drug

transaction on May 8, 1991 by telling Appellant that her friends
were looking for cocaine (T. 108), she and Appellant, after having met initially at a bar, had shared a dinner for two at his
house; he had come to her house and chopped wood for her, drunk
coffee in her kitchen, and kissed her.

They had spent a few hours

together riding in Appellant's truck around Cedar City looking at
the Christmas lights, and had phone conversations unrelated to
drug transactions (T. 104). They had, in Burchett's own words,
established a "social relationship" (T. 130) in which she had
gained his "trust and confidence" (T. 128), a relationship upon
which she clearly relied when she initiated the first transaction.
In the language of Taylor these transactions leading up to the
first offense, the interaction between Burchett and Appellant,

and his response to her inducements point inescapably to the
conclusion that Burchett's conduct created a substantial risk
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready
to commit it.
While the evidence in this case does not involve a
sexual relationship between Appellant and agent Burchett [as, for
example in Taylor and in State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah
1975)], the male-female aspect cannot be ignored, and the fact
that Burchett is a woman is absolutely vital in considering the
effect of her friendship with Appellant.

The intimate dinner he

cooked for her at his home, the nighttime car ride to look at the
Christmas lights, and the favor of chopping wood are not events
which normally transpire between mere friends of the same sex.
This was a dating relationship despite Burchett's attempts to
deny that fact (PT. 3 3 ) , and during the trial even she became
resigned to the proposition that her contacts with Appellant,
such as the pleasure trip to Mesquite, Nevada, were "dates"
(T. 105). And although she made some distinction between his
kissing her and her kissing him (T. 103), Appellant's motivation
was obviously one of affection.

Burchett regarded the social

aspects of the relationship as unimportant (T. 101), but these
events are at the core of entrapment:
"The government, once employing an
undercover agent, cannot choose to
select those actions of the informer which are beneficial to its
case, and refuse to be responsible
for the total conduct of its agent
while engaged in the deception."
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 751
(Utah 1975) (Maughan, J. dissenting).

Burchett's total conduct in this case falls far below the proper
use of governmental power,

Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.

369, 382 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and is completely
contrary to the fair and honorable administration of justice.
She clearly "capitalized on a special relationship," State v.
Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah App. 1987), appealing to the
friendship she had established with the Appellant, stepping
entirely beyond the limits on permissible police activity in an
advanced society.

State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 502 (Utah 1979).

The relationship between Burchett and Appellant was significantly
more intimate than that between the agent and defendant in State
v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987), a case in which the Utah
Supreme Court, affirming the trial judge's ruling that the defendant had been entrapped by the female officer, commented:
"Clearly, the defendant saw more in her
than a business relationship. Why didn't
the police send in a male officer? Or
an unattractive female police officer?
The answer is clear from the relationship which developed." 734 P.2d at 468.
This case must be distinguished from State v. Wynia,
754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988), in which two undercover females
had only two contacts with the defendant, each occasion resulting
in

the defendant's sale of drugs to the agents.

These meetings

were in a public bowling alley/lounge and in a second lounge, and,
except for an agent buying the defendant drinks, nothing else
other than the drug transactions took place between the agents
and the defendant.

This Court found no entrapmentf ruling that

the police conduct was consistent with the fair and honorable
administration of justice.

754 P.2d at 670.

The relationship

between Appellant and Burchett, however, had progressed far beyond
the superficial contacts this Court approved in Wynia; by the time
the drug transactions took place, they had spent many hours alone
together, establishing at least a close personal friendship which
had many of the elements of a romance.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS JEFF FARR.
I.

Statutory and Decisional Law

The trial judge ruled that the testimony of Jeff Farr
was inadmissible as a "specific instance of the conduct" of agent
Anne Burchett and therefore unprovable by extrinsic evidence within the prohibition of Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Because the witness Anne Burchett had in her trial testimony denied
that she had used illegal drugs during her investigation of Appellant1 s case, Jeff Farr's proffered testimony that he had personally observed Burchett to use and be under the influence of illegal drugs during that time
agent Burchett.

directly impeached the testimony of

Even if his testimony was otherwise prohibited by

Rule 608(b), it was nonetheless admissible impeachment of Burchett:
"In accordance with Rule 608, Utah
courts have consistently held that
impeachment evidence is admissible
if it goes to credibility, even
though it introduces evidence which
would be otherwise inadmissible."
State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481
(Utah App. 1991).

In Reed, the defendant had testified that he had told a witness
that he did not use drugs, and this Court approved the prosecutor's
subsequent inquiry of both the defendant and a third witness
about drug paraphernalia found at the defendant's house.

The

Court observed that credibility was a crucial issue; first, the
defendant's testimony had directly contradicted that of another
witness.

Second, the defendant's testimony directly attacked the

character of another witness.

Third, the defendant had denied the

use of drugs, and the Court ruled that inquiring into the presence
of drug paraphernalia in the defendant's house was permissible impeachment.

820 P.2d at 481.
This case is factually identical to Reed.

Burchett had

testified that she did not use illegal drugs during her undercover
assignment, and Farr's testimony had a direct bearing on her credibility on that point.

In addition, in this case, the entire

behavior of the police was the only issue before the jury, and
Farr's testimony was monumentally important to the inquiry (T. 135).
His evidence was manifestly much more than the general attack on
credibility prohibited by Rule 608(b), State v. Hackford, 737
P.2d 200 (Utah 1987), and was improperly excluded by the trial
court.

The error affected the substantial right of the Appellant

to present his defense of entrapment, the only defense offered, and
was therefore reversible,

Utah R. Evid. 103(a), a proffer of the

substance of Farr's testimony having been made on the record (T.
133) .

II.

Constitutional Basis

The trial court's exclusion of the testimony of defense
witness Jeff Farr prevented Appellant from presenting his only
defense witness, whose testimony had a direct bearing on the credibility of the undercover agent and upon the propriety of the
police conduct in this case, the very issue raised by Appellant's
defense of entrapment.

Appellant was thus deprived of his fun-

damental right to present a witness in his defense, and the
deprivation was of constitutional dimensions.

Although the Utah

Supreme Court has held that the violation of an evidentiary standard is not in every case a constitutional deprivation, State v.
Hackford,

737 P.2d 200, 205 (Utah 1987), this Court is urged so

to hold in this case.
A.

Due Process

An early Utah case dealing with Art. I, §7 of our state
Constitution observed:
"Many attempts have been made to further
define 'due process' but they all resolve into the thought that a party
shall have his day in court — that is
each party shall have the right to a
hearing before a competent court, with
the privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause
or defense, after which comes judgment upon the record thus made."
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316
(Utah 1945).
In the circumstances of this case, the language of Christensen
is directly in point.

Because Jeff Farr was the only defense

witness other than hostile police officers, and because his
testimony had a direct bearing on the credibility of the state's
principal witness and upon the propriety of the conduct of the
police,

his exclusion as a witness prevented Appellant from

having his "day in court," and denied Appellant the "privilege
of being heard and introducing evidence to establish" his defense.
The error in excluding Farr's testimony was therefore a denial of
Appellant's right to due process guaranteed by Utah Const, art. I,
§7.
B.

Right to Present Witnesses

The language of Utah Const, art. I, §12 includes the
right of the accused "to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf . . . "

Implicit in this

language is the right to present such witnesses at trial.

No

Utah case has dealt with this aspect of our Constitution, but
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has recognized the right of
a defendant to present witnesses in his defense as being based in
a Maryland Constitutional provision similar to Utah's.

In

Brooks

v. State, 560 A.2d 56 (Md. App. 1989), the court held that the
trial court's erroneous exclusion of a defense witness who would
have testified in a DUI case that the defendant was not driving the
car amounted to a violation of the defendant's right under Article
21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to "present witnesses in
his defense."

560 A.2d at 59.

Article 21 of the Declaration of

Rights under the Constitution of Maryland guarantees criminal de-

fendants the right "to have process for his witnesses; to
examine the witnesses for and against him on oath

..."

This Court is invited to find the identical right to present
witnesses in Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution, and to hold
that this right cannot be abrogated by a statutory rule of evidence,
nor by the erroneous application of such a rule as occurred in
this case.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant was entrapped into commission of the offense for which he was convicted, and this Court should reverse
the conviction.

If the Court does not reverse on the entrapment

issue, it should hold that the exclusion of the testimony of Jeff
Farr was error affecting the substantial right of Appellant to
present his defense, both as a matter of statutory and decisional
law, as well as under the Constitution of the State of Utah.

If

the Court reverses on this ground, the case should be remanded to
the District Court for a new trial on Count II of the Information.
Respectfully Submitted,
JAY D. EDMONDS #957
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE
I certify that on August 31, 1992, I delivered four
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah.

APPENDIX

Note:

On

January 23, 1992, a hearing was held on Appellant's

Motion to Dismiss Based on Entrapment in this case below.

A

similar hearing on a similar motion was heard at the same time
in the case of State v. LeVasseur, since the same witnesses and
the same counsel were involved in both cases.
now on appeal to this Court.

Both cases are

State v. LeVasseur is assigned

Case No. 920444-CA in this Court.

The record on appeal in each

case includes a separate transcript of the January 23, 1992
entrapment hearings held in the District Court.

In preparing

these two separate transcripts, however, the reporter, for the
sake of continuity and in conformity with the procedure followed
by the trial judge in making his rulings, included the court's
findings and conclusions on Appellant Martinez' motion only in
the LeVasseur transcript; the Martinez entrapment hearing transcript in the record in this case does not contain these findings
and conclusions.

An exact photocopy of that part of the LeVasseur

entrapment hearing transcript which contains the Martinez findings
and conclusions is therefore included in this Appendix.

The

original of these photocopied pages is in the original transcript
on file in this Court under Case No. 920444-CA.
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MR. BURNS:

Okay-

Moore and Belt are 1989 cases, and

Moore and Belt cite the law in the state of Utah as being a
normal or an average person.
Cripps case.

Five years newer than the

I think the cite that counsel got came out of

the right case, 744, but it's actually 692 P2d. 747.
MR. EDMONDS:
THE COURT:

That was the cite that I gave the Court.

That's correct.

Well, as I indicated, I'd —

I don't really think

there's any dispute as to what the law is.

It's been

articulated now in several cases. All of which I've read.
I think the law is that entrapment occurs when a law
enforcement officer or person directed by or acting in
cooperation with an officer induces the commission of an
offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for
prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it.

I think that's what the law is, and I think

that's what the courts have held.

Conduct merely affording

a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not
constitute entrapment.
The focus of that section is whether the conduct
of the police was such that it falls below proper standards
for the proper use of government power.

In other words,

whether it comports with a fair and honorable administration
of justice.

And these cases all turn on their facts.

PATTT
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In Mr. Martinez' case, the facts, as I have them
at this point, indicate that upon his first meeting with the
undercover agent in November of 1990, he inquired as to
whether she used coke and further told her about his having
used coke the prior weekend.

Their next discussion about

coke was when she was at his house for dinner.

She

indicated that she had some customers that would like to
obtain coke, and he came up with a suggestion that she could
make a lot of money.
could get her —

That he had a contract in Vegas and

get" her the cocaine from there.

There were —

is no evidence before me of any

intimate relationship, although there is friendship.

And

the Moore case clearly holds that friendship alone is not
enough.

There must be more.

There must be some

inappropriate plea to the defendant's sympathy or to his
passions through promises of sexual favors or through an
ongoing sexual relationship.
None of that occurred in this case.

The agent

didn't offer Mr. Martinez any large amounts of money.

In

fact, Mr. Martinez apparently profited little from these
transactions, except that he may have had some aspirations
for an improvement in the intimacy of their relationship.
But the agent did nothing to encourage that, so far as the
evidence indicates at this point.
The relationship lasted from November to July, and
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there was no sexual conduct, no offer of sexual conduct, and
no promise of any sexual conduct in exchange for cocaine.
The issue was raised as to whether or not there
had been an appeal —
defendant —

an inappropriate appeal to the

defendant's sympathies when the agent informed

the defendant that her parents had been involved in an
accident.
to his —

I don't find that that was an attempt to appeal
his sympathies.

Even if it was, the trip to

Las Vegas for the second batch of cocaine had already been
planned.

They were "both going to go.

He did not go simply

because he'd been informed that her parents had been in an
accident.

He simply carried out the prearranged plan

without her and brought the cocaine back to her.
All in all, I find that the defendant was not
entrapped.

That none of the agent's conduct was such that

would violate proper standards of use of governmental
power.

And that —

he was entrapped.

I cannot find, as a matter of law, that
Although I understand that the issue can

be reasserted before a jury, and they can make their own
finding.

The agent in this case merely provided an

opportunity to commit the offense, and it was the defendant
who appeared to be interested in —

in cocaine, from the

outset.
Any questions?
MR. EDMONDS:

I have nothing.
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